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Abstract--In this paper a theory for two-person zero sum multicriterion differential games i presented. 
Various solution concepts based upon the notions of Pareto optimality (efficiency), security and 
equilibrium are defined. These are shown to have interesting applications in the formulation and analysis 
of two target or combat differential games. The methods for obtaining outcome r gions in the state space, 
feedback strategies for the players and the mode of play has been discussed in the framework ofbicriterion 
zero sum differential games. The treatment is conceptual rather than rigorous. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Noncooperative game theory mainly deals with scalar criterion games. Even in nonzero sum games, 
which admit Nash equilibrium solutions, each player has a single criterion which he alone wishes 
to optimize, regardless of the payoff to the other players. But games having multiple noncompar- 
able performance criteria, called games with vector payoffs or multicriterion games, in which 
simultaneous optimization of all the criteria is desired by each of the two players, are also an 
important class of zero sum noncooperative games. They have attracted limited attention in the 
game theory literature to date due to the lack of availability of multicriterion game models of 
conflict situations. In addition, many of the elegant and intuitively appealing theoretical results in 
scalar criterion games could not be duplicated in the existing theory of multicriterion games. 
Multicriterion games can be both static and dynamic in nature. Static multicriterion game had 
its inception with a paper by Blackwell [1] in which an asymptotic analog of the min-max theorem 
in scalar criterion matrix games was established for repeated games with vector payoffs. 
Subsequently, the concepts of equilibrium points, min-max and max-min points for these games 
and their computational methods, were proposed in [2-4]. In [5], the notions of Pareto optimality 
and security strategies were combined to obtain solution concepts for these static two-person zero 
sum multicriterion games. 
The dynamic noncooperative multicriterion game is treated by Schmitendorf [6], in which the 
concepts of security strategies and Pareto optimality arc used. Some of the notions used in [6] have 
been developed in the literature on coalitive Pareto optimality [7]. Recently, two-target games [8], 
also known as combat games [9, 10], have attracted attention in the differential games literature 
as further generalization of the well known pursuit-evasion games [11]. It was found that these 
games lend themselves naturally to a two-person zero sum multicriterion game formulation [12, 13] 
for which only a limited number of solution concepts and results are available. 
In aerial combat problems, the notion of reprisal strategies [14] and equilibrium point solution 
[15, 16] have been discussed earlier, but not in the context of multicriterion games. In this paper 
we present a formal theory for two-person zero sum multicriterion differential games based upon 
the concepts of Pareto optimality (efficiency), security, response (reprisal) and equilibrium points 
and illustrate its application in the formulation and analysis of combat games. 
Section 2 of the paper mainly addresses the two-person zero sum multicriterion differential game 
under a quantitative set up under the assumption that there is only a single target set and derives 
some general results. Section 3 presents the general two-target or combat game and defines its 
solution in terms of qualitative outcome regions using Pareto optimal security strategies of the 
players. Section 4 discusses the possible pattern of play inside each outcome region in the state 
space. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
tBased on research supported by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, India, through a Research Associateship 
grant o the first author. 
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2. TWO-PERSON ZERO SUM MULT ICRITERION QUANTITATIVE 
D IFFERENTIAL  GAME 
2.1. Problem formulation 
Consider a vector performance criterion (or payoff function), d = [J, . . . . .  J,]' where 
Ji(xo, to, u, v) = 49i(xf, tf) -I- Li(x, u, v, t) dt, i = 1 . . . . .  n. (1) 
,)to 
This is to be minimized by player P1 who controls u(t) and maximized by player P2 who controls 
v(t). The payoff function given here is of the Bolza type but in general could be of some other 
kind also (e.g. Chebyshev criteria). The dynamics of the system is given by 
=f(x ,  u, v, t), X(to) = Xo, (2) 
where x e ~P, u e U e ~q and v e V e ~r; U and V are compact sets. The termination of the game 
takes place when (xr, tr) ~ ~-. The playability of the strategy pair (u, v) is assumed. For example, 
the game could be of a fixed time interval such that termination occurs when tr = T. In such a case 
all strategy pairs are playable. 
Two types of information structures are considered here. In the first, the players are aware of 
the initial condition (x0, to) but no subsequent s ate information is available to them and therefore 
have to choose open loop control programs as their strategies for the duration of the game. The 
strategy sets are then defined as 
q /= {u(.): u(.) is piecewise continuous function from (to, tr) ~ U}; (3) 
= {v(.): v(.) is a piecewise continuous function from (to, tr)~ V}. (4) 
In the second case, the players are aware of the current state information (x, t) during the course 
of the game and therefore use feedback strategies. This is a more realistic case. The strategy sets 
are then defined as 
q /= {u(', ') : u : ~P x [to, tt] ~ U}, (5) 
~V" = {v(', ") : v : ~P x [to, tr] ~ V}. (6) 
For ease in representation we shall write u and v for both kinds of stratagies used by the players 
and indicate whether they are open loop control programs or feedback strategies whenever it is 
necessary to distinguish between them. 
The payoff achieved when P1 uses a u e q/ and P2 uses a v ~ U is 
J (u ,  v )  = [J1 (u ,  v ),  . . . , S , (u ,  v)]', (7) 
where Ji(u, v) is as defined in (1). Thus we have a two-person zero sum n-criterion dynamic game. 
2.2. Solution concepts 
The solution concepts to be developed should take into account he trade-off problem that each 
player is faced with, due to the requirement of optimizing n different criteria simultaneously. In 
addition, a player is also beset by a strategic uncertainty problem caused by the ignorance of his 
opponent's trade-off. 
Exactly as in scalar criterion games, the concept of security levels and security strategies can be 
defined here. Associated with every strategy u ~ q/(v ~ "U) of player P1 (P2), there exist security 
levels in each of his criteria Jj, j = 1 . . . . .  n. It is denoted by ~(u) (~(v)) for P1 (P2) and is defined 
as the payoff with respect o the j th criterion when P1 plays u e q/ (P2 plays v e ~)  and the 
opponent P2 (P1) does his best to maximize (minimize) the j th criterion. Hence, 
~(u)=maxJ j (u ,v ) ,  j=  l . . . .  ,n, (8) 
VE'~" 
~(v)=min J j (u ,v ) ,  j - -  1 . . . . .  n. (9) 
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Thus, the security levels are n-tuples of the form ? (u) - [~(u)  . . . . .  ?n(u)] and 
_J(v)- [-Ji (v) . . . . .  J,(v)], which represent the guaranteed payoffs in each of the criteria to the 
players P1 and P2 when they use strategies u e ~ and v ~ f respectively. 
Definition 2.1 
A strategy u*(v) is a Pareto optimal response strategy (PORS) for PI against a known strategy 
v of P2, if there exists no alternative strategy u with Jj(u, v) <<. Jj(u*(v), v), j = 1 . . . . .  n, and strict 
inequality holding for at least one j. 
Similarly, one can define a strategy v*(u) to be a PORS. The sets of PORS for the players against 
an opponent's known strategy are denoted by ~r(V) and ~(u). 
Definition 2.2 
A strategy u* is a Pareto optimal security strategy (POSS) for P1 if there exists no alternative 
strategy u with ~(u)~< ~(u*), j = 1 . . . . .  n, with strict inequality holding for at least one j. 
Similarly, one can define a strategy Vs* to be a POSS for P2. The sets of POSS for the players 
are defined as q/s and ~¢/~. Note that unlike PORS, ~//s and ~ are independent of the strategy followed 
by the opponent. The members of these sets are analogous to the security strategies in scalar 
criterion games. In fact, for n = 1, .~(Us) and _J(vs) for us ~ q/s and v s ~ ~ are nothing but the upper 
and lower values of the game. But unlike the scalar criterion games, where these values are unique, 
there could be multiple upper and lower values in vector criterion games. 
Proposition 2.1 
For every us ~ q/s and Vs e 
~(vs)~<~(us), j = 1 . . . . .  n. [] (10) 
This is analogous to a result in scalar criterion games which says that the upper value (loss ceiling) 
of a game is never less than its lower value (gain floor). 
Based upon the above concepts, various solution concepts for the quantitative solutions of 
multicriterion games can be proposed. 
(a) Play with PORS. A player uses Pareto optimal response strategies based upon the knowledge 
of the opponent's strategy. Such strategies allow taking advantage of opponent's errors in strategy 
if known in advance, but do not provide protection against opponent's strategy deviations. A player 
has the choice between a number of PORS and is therefore free to choose a proper trade-off 
between his n criteria. 
(b) Play in the mutual response mode. A pair of strategies (u*, v*), u* e ~d, v* ~ ~e', is said to 
be Pareto optimal in the mutual response mode (or in equilibrium), if 
u~*rqlr(v~*) and v*~(u* ) .  (11) 
This definition is identical to the usual definition of equilibrium points in multicriteria games 
[3, 4]. This can be proved as follows: 
u*~ ~qlr(v*)~ 3 no ~¢/ ,  ~Jj(a,v*) <~ Jj(u*,v*), 
j = 1 , . . . ,  n and strict inequality holding for at least one j
J(u, v*) .~ J(u~, v~*), Vu E all. (12) 
We say that a vector J(u,v*),C:J(u*,v*) when 
Jj(u, v*) > Jj(u*, v*) for at least one j. 
Similarly, it can be proved that 
either Jj(u, v*) = Jj(u*, v*) for all j or 
v* ~ g(u*) ,--, J(u*, v*) .t Y(u*, v), vv ~ ~.  (13) 
This means that by unilateral deviation a player cannot improve his payoff in all the elements of 
the vector criterion simultaneously. 
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Obviously, for n = 1 (scalar criterion), this reduces to the definition for saddle or equilibrium 
point, i.e. 
J(u*, v) <~ J(u*, v*) <~ J(u, v*), Vu • ql, Vv • ~ e~. (14) 
Unlike the scalar criterion case, the equilibrium strategies in multicriterion games do not have 
the ordered interchangeability property. Due to this reason they have all the attendant problems 
of PORS if a player is not aware of the strategy being used by the opponent. They also do not 
offer any security or protection to the players. These characteristics are somewhat similar to those 
in Nash equilibrium solutions of scalar criterion nonzero sum games. 
(c) Play with POSS. A player uses Pareto optimal security strategy which offers him efficient 
guaranteed protection against deviation by the opponent. The advantage of this kind of strategy 
is that knowledge of the opponent's trategy is not necessary to arrive at one's own strategy. 
(d) Play with equilibrium strategy with Pareto optimal security levels. A pair of strategies 
(u*, v*), u* •~'s and v* • ~ is said to be a pair of equilibrium strategies with Pareto optimal 
security levels if they also satisfy (11). These strategies have all the advantages ofbeing PORS, while 
at the same time they also offer efficient security levels against deviation by the opponent. The main 
difficulty here is that the set of POSS and the sets of equilibrium strategy pairs might be disjoint. 
Even otherwise, the trade-off options between various criteria are limited. 
(e) Play with Pareto optimal saddle point strategies. A strategy pair (u*, v*) u* •~/, v*•  ~,, is 
said to be in Pareto optimal saddle point equilibrium if 
a~(u*) =Jj(v*), j = 1 . . . . .  n. (15) 
This satisfies the conditions of all the previous solution concepts as well. Also, it is the Pareto 
optimal saddle point concept in multicriterion games that is truly equivalent to the saddle point 
in scalar games (i.e. min-max = max-min). 
Proposition 2.2 
If a Pareto optimal saddle point exists then for all u* •~s and for all v* • ~,  
Y(u~*) = J(v~*). [] (16) 
This proposition shows that when a Pareto saddle point exists, all POSS are also Pareto saddle 
point strategies and vice versa. The game has a unique value. 
These strategies have all the advantages of PORS and POSS, the property of ordered 
interehangeability holds and thus they provide an ideal solution to the problem. But such strategies 
seldom exist in games except for the very simplest ones [13]. 
In summary, security level based play is better suited when there is more strategic or tradeoff 
uncertainty or when guaranteed criterion function levels are more important. Equilibrium point 
based play may be better suited when players have less strategic or trade-off uncertainty (when they 
have perfect antagonism or when each player places emphasis on a different criterion). Each player 
has to choose the mode of play (security or equilibrium) and a precise choice of strategy to reflect 
the trade-offs and hedge against uncertainty. 
2.3. Determination of Pareto optimal response, equilibrium and security strategies 
All the above solution concepts and associated strategies are based on the determination of 
sets of POSS and PORS given by q/s, ~ and qg,, ~ ,  respectively. The main ideas used here are 
based upon scalarization procedure in vector optimization [17] and coalitive Pareto optimality in 
games [7]. 
Conceptually PORS are easy to obtain. They require the solution of a one-sided vector 
optimization problem in which a known strategy (either open loop or feedback) of the opponent 
is used. The performance index is scalarized with a convex combination of weights. The problem 
ultimately reduces to an optimal control problem with scalar criterion. A number of techniques 
are available for such problems [17]. 
To determine POSS for players we define two scalar games, one for each player, and prove that 
the rain-max (for P1) and max-min (for P2) solutions of the games are also POSS for the 
corresponding players. So for P1, we have the Pl-game which is a parametrized zero-sum scalar 
criterion differential game in which the opponent uses multiple response. We shall first consider 
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the case of obtaining open loop POSS for P1 and then point out the modifications necessary to 
obtain closed loop POSS. 
P l -game.  The performance index is a scalar form 
J l (u, (v) . . . . .  v.)) = ~l Jl (u, vl) + ' "  "+ u j . (u ,  v.), (17) 
with system equations 
Yci =f (x i ,  u, vi) x,(to) = xo, i = 1 . . . . .  n. (18) 
Here, x~ e ~P, vi e ~, i -- 1 . . . . .  n and u e q/. The objective is to obtain 
rain max {J)[u, (vl . . . . .  v,)]}, i = 1 , . . . ,  n. (19) 
u~all v iE~ 
It is to be noted that xi and v~ affect Jl through J~ only, whereas u affects J~ through all the J,-s. 
In other words, this can be thought of as a set of n games, each having the same dynamics and 
termination condition as the original game, being played simultaneously with PI using the same 
control u in all the games in an attempt to minimize the weighted payoff J ~ and P2 using n different 
controls to maximize the payoff J~ in the individual games (thus maximizing the total payoff j l ) .  
Let 
_v = (v~ . . . . .  v,) ~ f i  V = V,. (20) 
i= l  
Definition 2.3 
A strategy u*~ q/is said to be a min-max strategy for the player P1 in the Pl-game if for all 
u E6~ t,
max f l  (u*, v_) ~< max J~ (u, 12_). (21) 
Theorem 2.1 
If a strategy u*e q/is a min-max strategy for P1 in the Pl-game for some ~k > 0, k = 1 . . . . .  n 
and ~ +. . .+~,= 1, then u* is also a POSS for P1 in the original game, i.e. u*~/s .  
Proof. See [7] and [13]. [] 
Obviously, if the Pl-game has a saddle point solution (u *, _v*) then u* als0 satisfies the conditions 
of Theorem 2.1 and thus qualifies for a POSS for P1. 
In an exactly similar way one can define the P2-game (with the roles of P1 and P2 interchanged, 
i.e. P2 the maximizer, has only one control but P1, the minimizer, has n different controls). A result 
identical to Theorem 2.1 can be obtained which says that the max-min solution for the P2-game 
for a specific set of ~, s produces a POSS for P2. 
Only sufficiency conditions for POSS in multicriterion differential game could be obtained here. 
In [5], it is proved that in static multicriterion matrix games, the existence of min-max solution 
of the Pl-game for an appropriate set of ~ks is both a necessary and sufficient condition for this 
strategy to be a POSS. 
In order to obtain feedback POSS for P1 we have to define a game similar to the Pl-game but 
with slight modifications in the strategy set of Pl. Since we are looking for the rain-max solution, 
P2 can still use his open loop strategy set as given in (4). But P1 has to employ a strategy from 
the set of feedback strategies (5) defined for the original game and use it in all the n games which 
together constitue the P1 game. Note that this is not the feedback strategy that Pl would employ 
to obtain rain-max solution to the Pl-game since then his strategy will be of the form 
u(x~, x2 . . . . .  x , ,  t). But in the present case if he uses the strategy u*~ ~,/then in the n individual 
games (which together constitute the Pl-game) his control at any given time t will be 
u*(x~, t), u*(x2, t) . . . .  u*(x , ,  t), respectively. Thus though the feedback strategy is the same in all 
the n games, their open loop representations will be different. With this modification in the 
definition of rain-max strategy, the result stated in Theorem 2.1 is valid. It is to be noted that in 
C.A.M.W.A. 18/I-3--I 
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the case of open loop strategies these two concepts of min-max are identical since the strategies 
are now independent of the state. 
This point is important in the computational procedure where one starts with an open loop 
control for PI. The normal practice is to assume an open loop control which is uniformly valid 
for the complete game. But here one can have different open loop controls for PI in all the n games 
depending on the choice of u* ~ q/. Obviously the difficulties associated with choice of feedback 
strategies and their open loop representations must be acounted for in the computational 
procedure. 
3. B ICRITERION GAMES WITH QUALITATIVE OUTCOMES 
3.1. Introduction and problem definition 
Bicriterion games are special cases of multicriterion games in which the dimension of the vector 
criterion is restricted to two. Such a formulation results from certain games known as two-target 
or combat games [8-10]. These are generalizations of the well known pursuit-evasion differential 
games. In two-target games there are two target sets and each player attempts to terminate the 
game on one of these while trying to avoid the other. In combat games these two target sets 
are usually the effectiveness envelope of the weapon system of the two players. A realistic example 
is an aerial combat between two aircraft carrying conventional weapons. Each tries to bring 
the other within his weapon range while avoiding his opponent's weapon system [14]. Another 
example is a missile duel between two aircraft in which each aircraft attempts to achieve a 
position to successfully fire a missile and then start avoidance maneuver to escape from the 
missile fired by the opponent [15]. All these can be formulated as bicriterion zero sum differential 
games. 
The state equations and strategy sets of the players are the same as defined in Section 2. Only 
the termination conditions are different. The target sets associated with players P1 and P2 are 
and ~2. A maximum allowable time T is imposed on the game. The game is said to have terminated 
at a finite time tf if 
x(tf)  6 -~1 u ~22, 
Player P1 wins the game if 
and P2 wins the game if 
The game ends in a mutual kill if 
and in a draw if it ends with 
x ( t )¢~U~2,  te[to, tr) or t f=T .  (22) 
x(tO e ~\~,  (23) 
x( tf ) ~ o~22~. (24) 
X ( t r ) ~ ,~ lq ~ -~ ~b (25) 
x(tf) ¢ ~u~, tf = T. (26) 
These are the four possible qualitative outcomes of a combat game. It is apparent hat in a 
combat game the two players wish to terminate the game on different parts of ~0~.  In effect, 
each player is playing two simultaneous and coupled games. One of them is an offensive game in 
which he tries to capture his opponent by bringing him as close as possible to his target set and 
the other is a defensive game in which he tries to avoid his opponent's target set by keeping as 
far as possible from it. These two objectives for any one player is the exact opposite of a similar 
pair of objectives for the other player. This provides the motivation for formulating a two-target 
or combat game as a zero sum bicriterion differential game. 
There are two major aspects in a game of this kind, one is termination (capture) and the other 
is avoidance (escape). Using the bieriterion games approach one can have either a qualitative or 
a quantitative description of avoidance when a player has successfully averted his opponent's target 
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set. Let d~(x, t) be the separation between target set ~,. and Pi's opponent. Then the corresponding 
criteria would be 
J~(u, v) = ( -  1) i+t min di(x, t). (27) 
,r ~ [to. i f ]  
This is in the form of a Chebyshev criterion and is minimized by P1 and maximized by P2. 
When a player is able to terminate the game in his own favour, termination may be quantified 
as 
Ji(u, o) = (--  1)ic~i(Xf, tr), i = 1, 2, (28) 
where ~bi( •, .): d~ x ~--.  ~+.  This is the form of the Meyer criterion and is minimized by PI and 
maximized by P2. Physically ~b~ could represent a suitable combination of encounter time and/or 
survival probability of the adversary depending upon the characteristics of the weapon system 
carried by Pi. 
The qualitative description attributes a zero value to (27) and (28) if avoidance or termination 
has taken place and nonzero constant value (positive or negative, as the case may be) if it has not. 
This way the combat game/two-target game can be modelled as a bicriterion game. The solution 
concepts and results presented in Section 2 are applicable with n = 2. Note that the termination 
condition is somewhat different and so the terminal time will be determined using equations 
(22)-(26). With this important modification the rest of the theory is valid for combat/two-target 
games. 
3.2. Demarcation of outcome regions using POSS 
When P1 uses a u e q /and P2 uses a v e ~,  the corresponding payoff is given as 
J(u, v) = [Jl (u, v), J2(u, v)]', (29) 
where, J](u, v) and J2(u, v) are given by (27) and (28). Thus points in the Jr-J2 payoff space can 
be associated with qualitative outcomes of the game. 
Win for Pl:J~(u,v)<~O, J2(u,v)<O. 
Win for P2: Jl (u, v) > O, J2(u, v) >~ O. 
Draw: Jt (u, v) > 0, J2(u, V) < O. 
Mutual kill: Jt (u, v) ~< 0, J2(u, v) ~> 0. (30) 
Each player will have individual preference ordering of the outcomes. Here we consider two cases 
and assume that a player is aware of his opponent's preference ordering. 
Case 1. Preference ordering for P1 and P2 are 
Pl: Win for Pl, Draw, Mutual kill, Win for P2; 
P2: Win for P2, Draw, Mutual kill, Win for PI. 
Case 2. Preference ordering for P1 and P2 are 
Pl: Win for P1, Draw, Mutual kill, Win for P2; 
P2: Win for P2, Mutual kill, Draw, Win for P1. 
Case l is more realistic in the context of an aerial combat between two equally matched players. 
Case 2 might arise in case of a weaker player or a suicidal opponent who prefers a mutual kill to 
a draw outcome. In the following, only feedback strategies are considered though the results are 
also true for open loop strategies. 
Proposition 3. I 
If there exists a winning strategy from a given initial condition (i.e. a point in the win region) 
of a player then there exists a winning POSS for the player. 
Proof. We will prove it for Pl only. The proof for P2 is analogous. 
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Consider a game in which there exists a winning strategy u* ~ q/for P1, i.e. i fPl  uses this strategy 
then he can always end the game in ~ 'x ,~ no matter what P2 does. Thus, 
Z(u*) ~<0, J2(u*) < 0. (31) 
This is true because if P2 can violate even one of these conditions, he can achieve an outcome better 
for himself than the outcome of win for P1, regardless of whether the preference ordering is 
according to Case 1 or Case 2. If u* ¢ ~s then there exists a ~ e ~//such that 
a~.(fi) ~< ~.(u*), j = 1,2, (32) 
with strict inequality holding for at least onej. This process can be continued till a POSS is obtained 
for P1 under conditions of compactness for U, V and continuity of Jj. [] 
Similarly one can prove the following propositions which we state without proof. 
Proposition 3.2 
If there exists a survival strategy for a player with which he can assure himself a draw from a 
given initial condition then there exists a POSS which assures him either a draw or a win for 
himself. [] 
We shall call such a strategy a survival POSS. 
Proposition 3.3 
If there exists a capture strategy for a player for a given initial condition, then there exists a POSS 
for him which assures him either a mutual kill or a win for himself. [] 
Thus for every strategy which is not a POSS there exists a POSS which assures an outcome which 
is either the same or better than the outcome assured by this strategy. This result is true regardless 
of whether the preference ordering is Case 1 or Case 2. 
From Proposition 3.1 it can be deduced that in order to determine whether a point in the state 
space belongs to the win region of a player, the security level associated with all the POSS at this 
initial condition may be obtained. If this point belongs to the assured win outcome region of the 
player then for at least one POSS the point will fall in the win region of the criterion function space. 
Thus, using POSS only the points in the state space belonging to the win region of the players can 
be demarcated. 
Now we consider the remaining portion of the state space after the win regions of the players 
are excluded. Considering the preference ordering according to Case 2, the draw region corresponds 
to that region where P1 has a survival POSS u* eq/s that assures him ~(u* )< 0. For this set of 
strategies one always has ~ (u*) > 0 since if it were not so then this initial condition would have 
been classified into the win region of P1. In this region P2 always has a v*(u*) ~ ~(u*) for every 
such u* such that a draw is achieved. Only by making an error in the choice of his strategy can 
P2 cause a win for P1 to occur. Otherwise with a careful choice of response strategies P2 can always 
see that a draw is obtained. Thus this region is the assured raw region for P1. The remaining region 
can be designated as a mutual kill region since P1 does not have a survival POSS to assure himself 
a draw. 
Consider the preference ordering according to Case 1, in which both players prefer a 
draw to a mutual kill. Once the win regions of the two players has been demarcated, the rest 
of the region is composed of a part where P1 has a survival POSS u* using which he can assure 
himself 
Y2(u*) < 0. (33) 
Here also ~ (u*) > 0 is guaranteed since otherwise the point would get classified as a win region 
of P1. 
Another part is the region formed by the points from which P2 has a survival POSS v* using 
which he can assure himself 
-Ji (v*) > 0. (34) 
Again _J2(v*)< 0 is guaranteed for P2 for the same reason. 
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Finally, there is the part in which PI and P2 can together cooperatively avert a mutual kill 
outcome by coordinating their strategies and obtain 
Jl(u,v)>O, J:(u,v)<O. (35) 
No security is associated with these strategies and therefore players in this region run the risk of 
the opponent deviating from the mutually agreed cooperative strategy pair and getting a win for 
himself. The region that is left out after this is a purely mutual kill region in which even cooperation 
is not possible. 
3.3. Discussion 
The barrier construction procedure in [18] proceeds from the usable part of the target sets and 
utilizes certain rules for the construction of the required semipermeable surfaces. It mainly follows 
the game of kind procedure of Isaacs. But this solution method, though effective for lower (~< 3) 
dimensional problems, has been found to be ineffective for higher dimensions. However the 
solution of the quantitative bicriterion differential game provides feedback strategies to the players 
in the different win/draw/mutual kill regions of the game space. POSS protects a player against 
opponent's optimal responses and are clearly useful for the players in their respective win regions. 
Play on the surfaces eparating the various outcome regions is also well determined due to the 
semipermeability notion and the risk of obtaining a less preferred outcome because of strategy 
deviations. In other regions, players can explore using PORS to take advantage of opponent's 
possible nonoptimal play. This idea has been proposed in the form of reprisal strategies in [14]. 
Equilibrium point based solutions which have been used in [15] and [16] do not meet with the 
requirements of combat players in the sense that outcomes are not assured and there is no 
protection against opponent's strategy deviations. POSS survival strategies are useful in the draw 
region to assure a draw outcome to the players. 
4. PLAY IN THE OUTCOME REGIONS OF BICRITERION GAMES 
The play in the win region of a player is quite simple. From Proposition 3.1, the winning player 
has a winning POSS. So a player need play only from his set of winning POSS as this will protect 
him from any attempt by the opponent to take the game out of the win region. Trade-offs between 
security levels is also possible and will form the basis for a choice between POSS. For example, 
it has been suggested in [10] that in the win region player P~ should try to optimize Ji in a scalar 
zero sum differential game. This idea can be adopted here too but with the additional constraint 
that the strategy used by Pt must be from the set of his winning POSS. This acts as a substitute 
for the event constraint mentioned in [10]. 
In the draw region the players have some flexibility in choosing their strategies. For example, 
if Pl has a POSS that ensures him rE(Us) very much less than zero then P1 can concentrate on 
minimizing J~ (u, v) by using a strategy which is not necessarily a POSS. The basic objective of P1 
in this region is to improve over the draw outcome by taking advantage of the opponent's strategic 
errors and force a win if possible. Thus he may use a PORS to achieve this objective. But P1 has 
to switch to a survival POSS as the state approaches the mutual kill or P2's win region, or the value 
of J'E(U) comes close to zero. Similarly, P2 may concentrate on maximizing JE(U, v) by using a PORS 
or some other strategy if _Jj (vs) is very much greater than zero. 
When J':(us) is very close to zero then P1 can try to minimize J2(u, v) by using a PORS. The 
objective is to go as far as possible form the opponent's weapon system. Here also the objective 
is to take advantage ofP2's errors. Similarly, when _J~ (vs) is very close to zero P2 tries to maximize 
Ji (u, v) by using a PORS. 
There could be other modes of play in the draw region specific to a particular application. For 
example in the problem of missile duel between two aircrafts, the objective of the players (aircraft 
pilots) is to decide whether to launch a missile at this instant of time and start avoidance maneuver 
to escape the other aircraft's missile, or to postpone missile launch till a better position for launch 
is attained. Here we consider the play for the player P1 (say) in an incremental basis to improve 
J'~ against a deterioration i  J':. In this case J~ is a function of the miss distance between Pi's missile 
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and the opponent's aircraft. If P1 does this at every instant, he would be attempting to reduce Ji 
to 0 with as much negative ,/2 (safety margin) as possible (for a possible win). The players thus 
try to optimize a ratio criterion: 
min max Ji/J2. (36) 
u~a,/ v~3V 
This problem is not likely to have saddle point solution as the criterion is not separable. Each player 
again has the option of a security or reponse strategy. 
Other modes of play in the draw region are also possible as suggested in [14]. The players may 
also resort to the optimization of a convex combination of Ji (u, v) and J2(u, v). But in every case, 
the player who rates draw better than mutual kill has to switch to a survival POSS as the state 
approaches the mutual kill/opponent's win region. 
Play in the mutual kill region when both players rate a draw better is quite complicated. There 
could be some element of cooperation i order to avoid the mutual kill outcome but such a strategy 
will be fraught with the risk of the opponent deviating from his cooperative strategy and achieve 
a win for himself. We will not deal with this aspect in detail here. Apart from this region there 
will be another egion in the mutual kill region in which the outcome of mutual kill cannot be 
averted even with full cooperation between players. An example is when the players are face to 
face with each other with overlapping weapon envelopes. Even if they try to turn away, they are 
bound to come in contact with the opponent's weapon envelope. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In summary, a theory for multicriterion two-person zero sum differential games has been 
developed in this paper. The concept of Pareto optimality, security strategies, response strategies 
and equilibrium points have been shown to give rise to interesting solution concepts for such games. 
The problem of two-target/combat g mes have been shown to present a realistic application area 
for the theory of multicriterion games. The method of demarcating qualitative outcome regions 
in the state space using Pareto optimal security strategies and obtaining feedback strategies for the 
players in these outcome regions has been presented. The possible modes of play inside the different 
outcome regions are also discussed. This kind of formulation for two-target games is different from 
the existing approaches and provide interesting insights into the nature of the solution concepts 
applicable to such games. 
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